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NORTHWEST CARRIERS, INC., PHILIP W. 
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Case No. 14533 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an original action brought in this court in 
which the plaintiffs seek to reverse the order of the Public 
Service Commission of Utah, in the Matter of the Application 
of defendant Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. to acquire the operating 
authority of C & M Service, Inc., as set forth by Contract 
Carrier Permit No. 511, Case No. 6257. 
DISPOSITION BY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
This case was originally heard on December 12, 1974. 
Based upon a Stipulation between counsel, the implication of 
which was not explained to Duane Hall, President of Duane Hall 
Trucking, Inc., plaintiff withdrew their opposition and on 
January 6, 1975 the Public Service Commission issued Permit 
No. 557 which contained a restriction to service for and on 
behalf of Shell Oil Company only. (R. 133-134) Subsequently, 
Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. obtained new counsel and on June 13, 
1975 filed a Petition for Rehearing. Various pleadings in 
support and opposing the Petition for Rehearing were also 
filed. On August 1, 1975 the Public Service Commission found 
that sufficient reason for rehearing had been made to appear 
but felt that they lacked jurisdiction to grant the petition 
for rehearing due to Section 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated. 
(R. 184) On August 13, 1975 the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah filed its decision in Case No. 13926, Mary A. Murphy, et 
al. vs. Public Service Commission of Utah, et al., reversing 
the previous order of the Commission in a Contract Carrier 
Permit Transfer proceeding. On September 9, 1975, defendant 
Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. filed a motion to reopen its proceed-
ing on separate jurisdictional grounds. (R. 156) Again, after 
various memorandum from both sides, the Commission entered an 
Order granting the motion to reopen. (R. 184-185) After a 
full hearing on the transfer of authority to the applicant of 
B & M Service, Inc.'s full authority, the Commission entered an 
Order on March 3, 1976 granting to Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. 
Contract Carrier Permit No. 557 without the restriction 
previously imposed. (R. 218-220) 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have the Report and Order of 
March 3, 1976 affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts is mis-leading and 
inaccurate. It omits to include a number of very material 
and uncontroverted facts. For this reason, the defendant 
desires to make its own Statement of Facts covering the facts 
that are relevant and material to the issues in this appeal. 
On September 18, 1974 Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. filed 
an application to acquire the full operating authority of 
B & M Service, Inc. with no restrictions or changes in the 
authority. (R. 110-118) The hearing on this matter was held 
January 6, 1975. The applicant was represented in this hearing 
by Mark K. Boyle, Esquire, who was also the attorney for B & M 
Service, Inc. In his uncontroverted affidavit, Duane Hall, 
the President of applicant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., set 
forth the factual background of the alleged stipulation which 
centered around limiting the application for authority to perform 
services for one shipper (Shell Oil Company) only. (R. 138) 
On the morning of the hearing Mr. Boyle discussed the 
proposed stipulation with Mr. and Mrs. Hall. They both objected 
to the stipulation, stating that they could not accept anything 
less than the transfer of the full authority of B & M Service, Inc. 
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Duane Hall never conceded to a stipulation for less 
than the full authority in Mr. Boyle's office, at the hearing, 
or at any time. At the hearing Mr. Boyle apparently agreed 
to the stipulation, contrary to the instructions of Duane Hall. 
When Duane Hall received the written order with the limitation 
of authority he contacted his Vernal attorney, John Beaslin. 
Mr. Beaslin failed to inform Duane Hall of the twenty day 
limitation for petition for rehearing. On January 28, 1975, 
Duane Hall came to Salt Lake City to discuss the limitation of 
authority with Mr. Boyle. Mr. Boyle advised him that he was 
two days too late to file a Petition for Rehearing. Duane Hall 
then contacted Ronald E. Casper, Secretary of the Public Service 
Commission, where it was decided to order a transcript of the 
hearing to determine what the alleged stipulation actually 
covered. (R. 139) 
Statements of counsel at the December 11, 1974 hearing 
indicate that the alleged stipulation was based on the erroneous 
assumption that the ruling of the Commission in the Pickering 
case id, was a final ruling, which was not the case. (R. 6) 
Duane Hall was never informed that the Pickering case was on 
appeal to the Supreme Court. (R. 146) Although Mr. Hall was at 
the hearing and personally voiced no objection to the stipulation, 
he thought that the stipulation meant they would be restricted 
to one type of contract and further thought that when Mr. 
Boyle objected to the words "or Shell Oil Company only" 
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(R. 5, Lines 13 and 24) that he was protected. (R. 145) 
After Mr. Hall obtained a transcript of the hearing, 
he retained Keith E. Sohm, Esquire, to present the facts to 
the Commission and ask for a rehearing. The Petition for Re-
hearing was filed on June 13, 1975 and set forth the facts 
listed above. (R. 136) The thrust of the Petition for Re-
hearing was that Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. should be entitled 
to put on evidence and argument to support a transfer of the 
full authority which he had previously purchased and that 
this opportunity was denied him by a gross misunderstanding 
and completely contrary to his desires and his instructions to 
his own attorney. (R. 137) The five trucking companies who 
were competitors of B & M Service, Inc. and now competitors 
of Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. filed an objection to the Petition 
for Rehearing. (R. 141) After numerous pleadings were filed, 
I 
on August 1, 1975, the Commission entered its Order denying 
the Petition for Rehearing. It is significant to note the 
language of the Order as follows: 
"The Commission is of the opinion that sufficient 
reason for rehearing has been made to appear. 
However Section 54-7-15, UCA, provides that 
applications for rehearing must be made prior to 
the effective date of the order or decision or 
within twenty days thereafter. The application 
in the present case was not within said time." 
(R. 154) 
The Commission then concluded by denying the rehearing on the 
limited and technical basis of lack of jurisdiction for a timely 
rehearing. 
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On August 6, 1975, the Utah Supreme Court filed its 
Decision in Mary A. Murphy v. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, 539 P. 2d 367, clarifying the burden of proof in a 
transfer proceeding. Based upon this ruling, in addition to 
the previous pleadings before the Commission, a Motion to 
Reopen was filed September 9, 1975, under the jurisdictional 
basis of Rule 60 (b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 156) 
Again, numerous memorandums were filed by the five trucking 
companies opposed to having a hearing on the merits. (R. 170) 
After considering the memorandums of law and the uncontroverted 
facts as set forth in the affidavit of Duane Hall concerning 
the alleged stipulation made against his will, by his former 
attorney, the Commission determined that it did have authority 
to reopen the matter and proceed with a full hearing under the 
provisions of Rule 60 (b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 60 (b) having its counterpart in Section 21.6 of Rule 21 
of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. (R. 184-
185) The Commission's Order stated that this was to be done 
in order to prevent an "inequity which would result were we to 
fail to reopen this matter and hold a further hearing". (R 185) 
After a full hearing on the transfer of the Contract 
Carrier Certificate, in which all parties participated, on 
March 3, 1976, the Public Service Commission entered its Report 
and Order granting the Applicant Duane Hall Trucking Inc. 
Contract Carrier Permit No. 557, which was the exact same authority 
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which previously was held by B & M Service, Inc. in Permit 
No. 511. (R. 218) In finding No. 3 of the Report and Order, 
the Commission stated that the alleged stipulation of limiting 
authority was based upon "the Commission's prior decision in 
the Murphy case", which was not correct. (R. 219) From its 
advantaged position of firsthand knowledge of the facts 
surrounding the alleged stipulation, the Commission unanimously 
recognized the inequality that would result without reopening 
the matter and having a full hearing on transferring the full 
authority to applicant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ON APPEAL THE FINDINGS AND REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ARE 
ENDOWED WITH THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND CORRECTNESS 
AND WILL BE REVIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THEM. 
The rule is well established in Utah that on appeal the 
Findings of Fact and Report of the Commission are presumed to 
be correct. This rule is set forth in Utah Gas Service Company 
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 18 Utah 2d 310, 422 P. 2d 530, 
as follows: 
"When the Commission, in performing its 
duties has given consideration to pertinent 
facts and has made its findings and decision, 
they are endowed with a presumption of validity 
and correctness. In accordance with the 
recognized prerogatives of the trier of the 
facts, on appeal the evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to sustaining them; and 
the decision will not be reversed unless when 
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the evidence is so viewed, there is no 
reasonable basis to support the Commission's 
action, so that it thus appears to be 
capricious and arbitrary." 
Additional cases involving a review of the Public Service 
Commission orders being presumed to be correct, include the 
following: Utah Parks Company v. Kent Frost Canyonlands 
Tours, 19 Utah 2d 252, 430 P. 2d 171; Armored Motors Service 
v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 23 Utah 2d 418, 464 
P. 2d 582; and Williams vs. Public Service Commission of Utah, 
29 Utah 2d 9, 504 P. 2d 34. 
This rule of review is based upon the sound reasoning 
"that some credit should be indulged in favor of the findings 
of the trial court because of the advantages peculiar to his 
position and immediate contact with the trial." Nokes v. 
Continental Mining & Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P. 2d 954. 
Such findings are presumed to be correct and the burden is upon 
the appellant to show that they are in error. There is nothing 
in the record to indicate that the Commission misapplied any 
proven fact or made any findings against the weight of the 
evidence. The actions of the Commission in reopening this 
matter were based upon its view of the facts and its action 
was not arbitrary or capricious. 
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POINT II 
IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO GRANT APPLICANT RELIEF UNDER RULE 
60 (b)(7) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Under the facts as previously related herein, and 
presented to the Commission, the Commission was satisfied 
that Duane Hall was denied an effective opportunity to 
comply with Section 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, to request 
a rehearing within twenty days. After obtaining new counsel, 
and without mention of Rule 60 (b), applicant filed a Motion 
for Rehearing. Obviously impressed with the inequality of 
the situation, the Commission denied the Motion for Rehearing, 
stating that, "the Commission is of the opinion that 
significant reason for rehearing has been made to appear. 
However, Section 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, provides that 
application for rehearing must be made prior to the effective 
date of the Order or Decision or within twenty days thereafter. 
The application in the present case was not made in said time." 
(R. 154) Thus, on the limited grounds of this statute, the 
Commission correctly denied the right to a rehearing. Applicant 
chose not to appeal this decision within thirty days as specified 
in Section 54-7-16, Utah Code Annotated, because the decision 
was correct based on the narrow grounds on which it was 
presented and upon the narrow grounds upon which it was decided. 
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The question was confined to jurisdiction on the time limit 
for rehearing as reflected by the statement of the Commission 
in the Order. Thereafter, applicant petitioned the Commission 
for relief under Rule 60 (b) (7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This was a separate remedy based upon the same grounds as the 
Motion for Rehearing and additional grounds. When presented 
with an additional jurisdictional basis under which to grant 
a full hearing into the matter, and with knowledge of the facts, 
the Commission unanimously granted the Order to Reopen. 
Respondents agree with plaintiffs1 characterization 
of the law that Rule 60 (b)(7) is not a substitute for the 
right to appeal. However, because the question of the applic-
ability of Rule 60 (b)(7) had not been raised in the first 
Motion for Rehearing, an appeal would not have resolved the 
question which is now before the court, i.e., was there 
justification under Rule 60 (b) for reopening the case for 
further consideration. Even if an appeal had been taken, 
respondent would still be entitled to pursue his additional 
remedy under Rule 60 (b)(7). 
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice re-
lieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
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Surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly dis-
covered evidence which by due diligence could 
not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) rraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other"mis-
conduct of an adverse party; (4) wnen, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not 
been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4 (e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been9 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application; or (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. The motion shall be made within 
a reasonable time and for reasons (1),(2),(3), 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judg-
ment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
A motion under this subdivision (bj) does not 
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power 
of a court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining 
any relief from a judgment shall be by motion 
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action." 
It is respondent's position that the facts clearly justify 
relief under Sub-section (7) which allows relief for "any 
other reason justifying relief from the Qperation of the 
j udgment." 
Rule 60 (b)(7) has been construed by the Utah Supreme 
Court on several occasions. Most of the cases involve setting 
aside default judgments. One of the leading cases wherein the 
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court invokes Sub-section (7) of the Rule, is Dixon v. Dixon, 
121 Utah 259, 240 P. 2d 1211. In that case the court held 
that a formal order signed and entered upon the erroneous 
assumption that it conformed to a direction of the court, is 
more than a mere inadvertence and can be set aside more than 
three months after its entry. The court in noting that it 
would work a "grave injustice to permit the order to stand1' 
also noted that even in the absence of Rule 60 (b)(7), the 
court would have inherent power to set aside the formal order. 
This case is somewhat similar to the instant case in that here 
there was a mistaken assumption on the part of the Commission 
and the original attorneys involved as to the burden of proof 
in a transfer proceeding for a contract carrier permit and 
the effect of a stipulation. 
Another case, the reasoning of which is in point, is 
Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114f where the court 
set aside a default judgment some eleven months after the date 
of judgment. The only grounds stated was that defendant was 
under the mistaken belief that she was fully protected under 
a divorce decree ordering her former husband to pay certain 
obligations. The court concluded that Rule 60 (b)(7) was 
intended to govern this type of situation, and pointed out the 
strong policy of the law to liberally construe the statutes and 
rules of procedure in favor of trial on the merits. The court 
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also recognized the latitude of discretion given the trial 
court in such matters and stated as follows: 
"The Utah decisions relied upon by 
plaintiff recognize the firmly established 
principle that it is largely within the 
discretion of the trial court whether a 
default should be relieved, which discretion 
will not be disturbed unless there is a patent 
abuse thereof." 
The reasoning of Ney v. Harrison has application to the present 
case in that the Commission does have broad latitude of discretion 
in determining to reopen under Rule 60 (b)(7). 
A case not involving Sub-section (7) of Rule 60 (b) but 
which strongly sets forth the policy of the law in granting 
relief from defaults the reasoning of which is analagous to the 
present case is Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 
376 P. 2d 951. In that case, the Supreme Court found an abuse 
of discretion and reversed the trial court for failing to grant 
relief. In speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Crockett 
wrote as follows: 
"It is undoubtedly correct that the trial 
court is endowed with considerable latitude of 
discretion in granting or denying such motions. 
However, it is also true that the court cannot 
act arbitrarily in that regard, but should be 
generally indulgent toward permitting full 
inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they can be 
settled advisedly and in conformity with law 
and justice. To clamp a judgment rigidly and 
irrevocably on a party without a hearing is 
obviously a harsh and oppressive thing. It is 
fundamental in our system of justice that each 
party to a controversy should be Afforded an 
opportunity to present his side oi; the case. 
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For that reason it is quite uniformly regarded 
as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate 
a default judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear, and timely application is 
made to set it aside." 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P. 2d 741 
involves a situation where the court refused to set aside a 
default judgment. The case simply stands for the proposition 
that the Supreme Court will not reverse a decision of the 
trial court unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. 
Although in this case (which involved an entirely different 
fact situation) the Supreme Court refused to substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court, the court commented that 
"Discretion must be exercised in furtherance 
of justice and the court will incline toward 
granting relief in a doubtful case to the end 
that the party may have a hearing." 
As to the matter of discretion, the court also stated as follows: 
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment 
is a creature of equity designed to relieve 
against harshness of enforcing a judgment, 
which may occur through procedural difficulties, 
the wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes 
which prevent the presentation of a claim or 
defense. Equity considers factors which may be 
irrelevant in actions at law, such as the un-
fairness of a party's conduct, his delay in 
bringing or continuing the action, the hard-
ship in granting or denying relief. Although 
an equity court no longer has complete discretion 
in granting or denying relief it may exercise 
wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors 
of fairness and public convenience, and this court 
on appeal will reverse the trial court only where 
an abuse of this discretion is clearly shown." 
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It should be pointed out that the order which plaintiffs 
are complaining of merely gave respondent defendant the right 
to put on his case and attempt to justify his"right to acquire 
the complete authority he contracted to purchase. After being 
duly noticed, a hearing into the matter was conducted on 
February 5, 1976 at which all five plaintiffs were represented 
and took part. (R. 27) It was only after a full hearing into 
the issues that defendant was awarded his full authority. 
The Public Service Commission is charged with "the 
prerogative and the responsibility of deciding questions relating 
to the regulation of carriers within this state for the purpose 
of seeing that the public receives the most efficient and 
economical service possible", Utah Parks Co. v. Kent Frost 
Canyonland Tours, 19 Utah 2d 252, 430 P. 2d 171. In carrying 
out this responsibility the Supreme Court will not question the 
wisdom of the decision made by the Commission. Rather, the 
Supreme Court is concerned with whether or not all parties are 
treated fairly. In Utah Gas Service Co. y. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company, 18 Utah 2d 310, 422 P . 2d 530, ttfxe c o u r t s t a t e d as 
f o l l o w s : 
"In proceedings before an administrative 
agency what a party is entitled to is to be 
treated with fairness: to have th$ opportunity 
to prepare and present his case ar^ d his con-
tentions with respect thereo; and to have an 
adjudication in conformity with the law; and 
the decisions of the Commission w^ll not be 
overturned because of irregularities of 
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procedure from which there is no substantial 
prejudice or adverse effect. The matters 
plaintiff complains of are not of any such 
consequence. It in fact received notice, 
filed its protest and counter-petition; and 
was in no way limited or prevented from full 
participation in the proceedings." 
The plaintiffs cannot claim that they were prejudiced or in 
any way prohibited from presenting their side of the issue to 
the Commission. In proceedings before the Public Service 
Commission the court has also stated in Armored Motors Service 
v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 23 Utah 2d 418, 464 P. 2d 
582, that: 
"What a party is entitled to is a full and 
fair opportunity to present his evidence 
and contentions on the issues; and to have 
an adequate consideration and a correct 
determination of them. But if the findings 
and order are correct it is not his 
prerogative to dictate or to complain about 
internal method of procedure by which the 
tribunal arrives at its findings and conclu-
sions. " 
This opportunity was presented fully to the plaintiffs. 
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
patterned after Rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Sub-section (7) of the Utah Rule is identical to 
Sub-section (6) of the Federal Rule, which provides relief for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." Under the Federal Rule motions under Sub-sections 
(1), (2) and (3) can be made within one year which differs 
from the three months limitation under the Utah rule. There are 
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numerous federal cases interpreting Rule 60 (b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules. Some of these case may be of help to the 
court here. 
The underlying principle of Federal Rule 60 (b)(6) is 
explained by Justice Black in the leading case of Klapprott v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.CT. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266, wherein 
the plaintiff was granted relief from a default judgment of 
denaturalization after the judgment had been entered for four 
years. There it was stated: 
"In simple English the language of the 
'other reason1clause, for all reasons except 
the five particularly specified, vests power 
in courts adequate to enable them to vacate 
judgments whenever such action is appropriate 
to accomplish justice." 
In interpreting the Klapprott and other Federal cases, Moore in 
his work on Federal Practice at Section 60.27 (2) sums up the 
effect of sub-section (6) as follows: 
"Seen in perspective, clause (6) is clearly 
a residual clause to cover unforseen contingencies; 
intended to be a means for accomplishing justice in, 
what may be termed generally, exceptional situa-
tions; and so confined, does not put the finality of 
judgments generally at large." 
If there were ever a case where Rule 60 (b)(7) ought and should 
be properly invoked, it is this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as 
cited herein, defendants respectfully request the court to 
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affirm the judgment and order of the Public Service Commission 
of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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